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FOLDED, SPINDLED, AND MUTILATED: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND

U.S. v. IBM. By Franklin M Fisher, John J. McGowan, and Joen E.
Greenwood. Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 1983. Pp. ix, 443.
$25.

United States v. IBM will go down in history as one of the largest, longest, and costliest antitrust cases ever filed by the government.
Thus, most people were surprised when William Baxter, then assistant attorney general in charge of the Antitrust Division, agreed to
dismiss the case completely some thirteen years after it was filed.
The dismissal led many to question what went wrong with the suit.
One wondered how the government could expend so many resources
and then say that the case was without merit. Had the situation
changed so completely since the case was filed, or had the government made a mistake by bringing the case in the first place? More
important, what should be done to avoid the recurrence of an I BMlike behemoth? In Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated, Franklin Fisher,
John McGowan and Joen Greenwood attempt to answer these ques-
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tions by giving the reader a detailed look at the workings of this
massive case.
All three of the authors were heavily involved in the development and presentation of IBM's side of the case. Fisher testified as
an expert witness, and McGowan and Greenwood both assisted
Fisher and provided economic consulting services for IBM counsel.
It is from this perspective that the authors present their position: the
government's case was always without merit and was brought merely
because the government's economic analysis was unsound (pp. 1-2).
To prove their thesis, the authors discuss many of the major issues in the case and present evidence that purports to explain why
IBM did not monopolize the industry. The authors first present a
general chapter on analyzing competition and monopoly to help
make the arguments accessible even to non-economists. In this
chapter, the authors criticize the traditional economic analysis of
competition as being too simplistic and prone.to error (p. 19). They
argue that the mistakes produced by relying on a superficial understanding of the competitive model stem from focusing on long run
equilibrium and analyzing the competitive situation in an industry in
light of expected equilibrium behavior. If an industry is not in long
run equilibrium - and the authors argue that the computer industry
was not - then it should not be expected to behave in the same
manner. Where long run equilibrium is absent, the authors conclude
that our traditional1 measures of monopoly power are not appropriate tools for analyzing a firm's behavior.
While this overview is helpful in explaining the types of analyses
that the authors will use in examining the computer industry, and in
pointing out the weaknesses of these analyses in some situations, it
can be misleading, particularly to non-economists. Unlike purely
academic discussions of these issues,2 this portion of the book is
designed with the goals of future chapters in mind. Thus, what appears at first to be a purely abstract discussion of issues is really a
way to set the stage for later arguments. Though this is not inappropriate, the reader should at least be aware that later chapters color
the author~• discussion of theory and should therefore evaluate the
book's opening arguments carefully.
·
An example of the possibility of misleading the unwary reader is
1. The authors discuss traditional analyses such as differentiated versus homogeneous
products, pp. 20-27, quality competition, pp. 27-30, innovative competition, pp. 33-37, and
other indicia of competition, pp. 39-41.
2. For a disinterested analysis, see ECONOMIC ANALYSIS AND ANTITRUST LAW (1979)
[hereinafter cited as ECONOMIC ANALYSIS). This book is a compilation of essays by leading
commentators on many of the economic issues addressed in antitrust cases. It is particularly
useful because it highlights the difficulties of drawing definite conclusions about the issues.
This is a strong contrast to the one-sided approach of the authors of Folded, Spindled, and
Mutilated.
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the authors' discussion of the role of market share data in monopolization cases. While the authors correctly argue that monopoly
power is not automatically proved by demonstrating a high market
share, they seem to imply incorrectly that market share information
should not be considered at all by the government in bringing an
antitrust action. Yet, in at least two ways, market share data is very
important as an indicator of potential monopoly problems and as an
element of monopolization cases. First, the courts often infer the
existence of some monopoly power when a firm holds a large share
of a market.3 While market share is not the only measure of monopoly power, it is important in determining whether a potential suit
exists and as some indication of that power.4 Second, actions that
are acceptable for firms with little share of a market may not be acceptable for a firm with a large market share.5 Market share data
combined with other indicators of market power create a presumption of monopoly power which may be rebutted if the defendant
proves that his market share was gained through superior skill. 6
From this general chapter, the authors proceed to develop the
specific economic analyses for the computer industry. They analyze
the industry as to market definition, market share, innovation, barriers to entry, and profits. Unfortunately, the way in which the authors develop these analyses raises problems of one-sidedness.
One important example is the definition of the relevant market.
Defining the relevant market is one of the most difficult tasks in an
antitrust case.7 Yet the authors' arguments imply that there is only
one possible measurement for the computer industry and challenge
the government's market share analysis on the ground that it defines
the market too narrowly. The authors claim: "When the analysis is
to determine if monopoly power exists, the fact of [market] constraints is the crucial issue for market definitions" (p. 75, emphasis in
original). That is clearly true and even the government would not
deny it. The hard question, which the authors do not adequately answer, is what constraints on a firm's actions are the relevant ones.
The important constraints are those that will constrain a firm before
3. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D.Mass.
1953), qffd. per curiam, 341 U.S. 521 (1954).
4. See, e.g., U.S. Dept. of Justice Merger Guidelines, June 14, 1982, at 16. Other things
being equal, concentration affects the likelihood that one firm, or a small group of firms, could
successfully exercise monopoly power.
5. See United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953),
qffd. per curiam, 341 U.S. 521 (1954).
6. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 497 (1974) (suggesting that
market shares are prima facie evidence of illegality and that it is up to defendants to show that
those market shares lack the significance that they would otherwise have).
7. For a discussion of the difficulties inherent in this procedure, see Boyer, Industry Boundaries, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2; Posner, The Problem of Markel i}ejinilion, in
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, supra note 2.
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it can earn monopoly profits. 8
The market definition that the authors offer appears to go to the
opposite extreme of the government's and becomes too broad. In
analyzing market shares, the authors define the relevant market as
the entire electronic data processing industry (pp. 110-21). The EDP
industry, however, includes everything from mainframe manufacturers to payroll processing companies. The authors do not explain why
these provide more relevant constraints than those selected by the
government. So once again the authors set out their analyses only in
the light most favorable to IBM.
While this one-sidedness is expected because of the authors' personal role in defending IBM, the book unfortunately degenerates
into a personal vendetta against the government's actions in the case.
Not only are the authors strongly critical of the government's positions in general (pp. 11-12), they also indulge in personal attacks on
the government's witnesses. The authors argue that the differences
between the two market definition approaches "did not for the most
part consist of matters over which reasonable people - let alone
trained economists - should differ" (p. 121 ). Yet reasonable people,
and even trained economists, will continue to differ over what is a
relevant constraint and how to define markets. This animosity toward the opposition repeatedly appears in the way that the book is
written and argued. It leaves an unpleasant taste and seriously
harms the authors' credibility.
Despite the difficulties created by its clearly one-sided approach,
the book is well worth reading for its exploration of the workings of
a massive antitrust suit. The book is a rare opportunity to see behind
the result of a case. Not since Kaysen's postmortem of his work as a
law clerk to Judge Wysanski in United Shoe 9 has the public had the
chance to see in such vivid detail what issues were critical to such a
suit and how they were resolved. Readers are able to see the different approaches one might take to defining a market, measuring the
impact of innovation, and measuring whether there are monopoly
profits. This book differs significantly from Kaysen's work, however,
as the authors of Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated were intimately involved as representatives of one of the parties. Thus, the reader
should keep in mind the author's perspective and continually question the book's conclusions: does the evidence justify the authors'
strong anti-government position or is it merely presented in a
slanted, unobjective manner?
The biggest contribution that the book makes is one that is not
the authors' primary objective. The reader is forced to realize that
8. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 239 (1981).
9. C. KAYSEN, UNITED ST.ATES Y. UNITED SHOE MACHINERY: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
OF AN ANTI-TRUST CASE (1956).
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the outcome of an antitrust case depends on economic analysis, as
well as how the various parties use the economic tools available to
them. The central issue in a section 2 case is whether the firm has ,
"monopoly power" 10 or has achieved its dominant market position
solely through "superior skill, foresight and industry." 11 There is no
easy proof of either of these positions and thus complicated economic analyses must be undertaken. Of course, opposing parties
will use the methodologies best suited to their respective positions in
the case. The judges, who often have little or no economic training,
must first make subtle judgments about which approach is more appropriate and then about the chosen approach's relevance to the issues at hand.
Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated does not convince the reader that
IBM was an exemplary competitor or that the suit should never have
been brought. Though the authors take Baxter's statement that the
case was "without merit" to mean that the case should never have
been filed (p. 369), a complete view of the case indicates that their
conclusion is not clearly warranted. In Baxter's memorandum to the
Attorney General, he admits: "It may well be that IBM is a monopolist and controls some segment of the computer market." 12 But
when one considered that the party most likely to have been harmed
by IBM's actions had already received a settlement of over $100 million in its own suit against IBM and that it was unclear that an appropriate remedy could be formulated, the continuation of the suit
appeared imprudent. This does not mean, however, that the suit was
"without merit" at the time it was begun. Further, w1iat appears so
clear to the authors today could not have been so clear to any of the
parties when the suit was filed in 1969. In fact, much of the information on which the authors base their judgments was not available at
that time. The computer industry has changed significantly in the
intervening years and in fact may have changed because of the suit.
Despite the one-sidedness of the authors' analysis and conclusions, Folded, Spindled, and Mutilated is important reading for anyone who may someday be involved in antitrust suits. The IBM case
highlights the pitfalls of proving or defending against a Sherman Act
claim. Thus, even if the reader is not convinced that IBM was right,
he or she is at least much more aware of the problems inherent in
such a case. Perhaps that awareness will prevent another IBM.
10. Monopoly Power is defined as the power to "control prices or exclude competitors."
Exercise of such power is a violation of§ 2 of the Sherman Act. United States v. E.I. Dupont,
351 U.S. 377, 389 (1956).
11. Ifa company attains a dominant position merely because it competed fairly and did a
better job than its competitors, it is not guilty of monopolization under the Sherman Act.
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 430 (1945).
12. The memorandum is reprinted in full in Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy,
the IBM Cares:, af!d the Transformation of the Law, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 587, 639-43 (1982).

